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Abstract: Can dynamic inefficiency that may occur in societies populated by non
altruistic agents be removed by introducing intergenerational altruism ? Although the
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equilibrium. Intergenerational transfers from the old to the young can therefore pro-
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1 Introduction
Dynamic efficiency is a key to understand a number of positive and normative ques-
tions raised by economic analysis. In particular it plays a critical role in the analysis
of the effects of fiscal (debt) policies in growth models. This analysis is usually de-
veloped in the overlapping generations settings of Diamond (1965) and Barro (1974),
both considering finitely lived agents. In Diamond (1965) people are pure life cyclers,
dynamic inefficiency1 can arise and public debt matters. In Barro (1974) agents are
linked across generations by altruistic bequests. In such a setting public debt is neutral
and the market equilibrium is dynamically efficient.
In view of such clear opposite conclusions one important question has been raised:
Can the dynamic inefficiency taking place in societies populated by non-altruistic agents
be ruled out by introducing intergenerational altruism ?
It is commonly assumed that the answer to this question is negative. Abel (1987)
and Weil (1987) argue that the dynamic efficiency result of Diamond (1965) is a neces-
sary condition for an altruistic bequest motive to matter and for the Ricardian equiv-
alence theorem of Barro (1974) to hold.
In this paper, we show that this form of dynamic inefficiency can be ruled out
by the introduction of Barro’s (1974) intergenerational altruism. Indeed, an intergen-
erational transfer from the old to the young can provide a solution to the dynamic
efficiency problem. Our solution therefore departs from the standard solution, public
debt (Diamond, 1965), fiat money (Wallace, 1980) or money bubbles (Tirole, 1985),
which transfer goods from the young to the old.
The paper starts by noting that Abel’s (1987) and Weil’s (1987) result relies on a
set of assumptions placed on the model to insure existence, uniqueness and stability of
the steady state of the underlying Diamond’s (1965) model. In a first step, we discuss
the relevance of these assumptions. In a second step, we relax most of them, just keep-
ing standard concavity hypotheses on economic fundamentals (utility and production
functions) and discuss the implications of our exercise. We finally provide a simple
example, inspired by Galor and Ryder (1989) and Nourry and Venditti (2001), to es-
1Such an economy is said to be dynamically inefficient since a Pareto–improvement can be achieved
by allowing the current generation to eat a portion of the capital stock and by leaving the consumption
of all future generations intact.
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tablish that the existence of an arbitrarily low proportion of altruistic agents can be
sufficient to rule out dynamic inefficiency in Diamond’s model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews both the seminal and the recent
literature on the existence of a steady state with positive bequests in Barro’s (1974)
model. It then presents a graphical intuition of the paper and some methodological
issues. In section 3, building on Galor and Ryder (1989), we develop a simple example
in which Diamond’s (1965) economy converges to a non Pareto optimal equilibrium
whereas Barro’s (1974) economy converges to a Pareto optimal steady state. Section
4 assesses the robustness and the relevance of the example.
2 An intuitive approach
The main idea of the seminal Robert Barro (1974) work is that a network of intergener-
ational transfers makes the typical person part of an infinitely lived family. Therefore,
the economy converges to the so–called Modified Golden Rule (hereafter M.G.R.) equi-
librium.2 The main objection to Barro’s result is that it requires positive bequests on
top of the assumption of altruistic consumers to be established.
2.1 - Positive bequests and intergenerational altruism.
The positiveness of bequests has been studied by several economists. Abel (1987)
and Weil (1987) were the first to establish a formal condition for the existence of a
steady state with positive bequests in Barro’s (1974) model (hereafter BM). Both of
them assume that the underlying overlapping generations economy — the Diamond’s
(1965) model (hereafter DM) — possesses a unique and (locally) stable steady state
capital stock, kD. This assumption implies that the function φ(k) that summarizes the
dynamics of DM is locally concave (in a neighborhood of kD). Under this restrictive
assumption, Abel (1987, Proposition 1) and Weil (1987, Proposition 2) show that be-
quests xM are positive in BM if and only if the M.G.R. capital stock, kM , is larger than
kD. Since kM is lower than the Golden Rule capital stock kG, this condition implies
that over-accumulation of capital3 in DM rules out positive bequests in BM. Then,
2The M.G.R. capital stock kM is equal to f
′−1[(1+n)/β] where f(.) is the neoclassical production
function, n > −1 the exogenous population growth rate and β ∈ (0, 1] the degree of altruism.
3Over-accumulation of capital occurs when the Diamond equilibrium kD is greater than the Golden
Rule kG = f ′−1(1 + n) and thus also greater than the Modified Golden Rule: kD > kG ≥ kM .
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the dynamic inefficiency that occurs in DM may not be removed by the introduction
of intergenerational altruism.
It is worth noting that this result relies on the uniqueness of kD and on the local
concavity (around kD) of φ(.). Recent researches indeed emphasize that these assump-
tions on DM are not fully appropriate to address BM for two main reasons.
First, Abel (1987, p. 1042) and Weil (1987, footnote 8) suggest that assuming
uniqueness of kD and local concavity (around kD) of φ(.) in DM should be sufficient
to avoid counterintuitive results in BM. This conjecture, though, has not been for-
mally proved. In a simple example, Thibault (2001) shows that an increase in the
degree of altruism can result in a decrease in the steady state level of bequests even if
kD is unique and φ(.) is globally concave. To rule out this counterintuitive result, an
assumption on the curvature of the production function f(.) is needed.4
Second, Galor and Ryder (1989) show that, contrary to the common wisdom, ex-
istence (and, consequently, uniqueness) of kD in DM is not guaranteed by standard
assumptions on fundamentals (i.e., concavity and Inada conditions of production f(.)
and utility U(.) functions). In fact, the concavity of φ(.) crucially depends on the
third derivatives of f(.) and U(.), which can take a broad range of values without
violating concavity of f(.) and U(.). As a result, even if kD exists, its uniqueness
requires stronger assumptions on the interaction of technology and preferences. Galor
and Ryder (1989) exhibit examples which illustrate this result: multiple steady-states
can arise in DM although both functions f(.) and U(.) are concave on their domains.
Obviously, φ(.) is not locally concave around all the equilibria kD in these examples.
Since assuming uniqueness of kD and local concavity of φ(.) around this kD is not
relevant, Thibault (2000) extends the analysis of Abel (1987) and Weil (1987) by es-
tablishing a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a steady state with
positive bequests in BM which holds whatever the number and stability properties of
equilibria in DM. When f(.) and U(.) are concave, Thibault (2000, Proposition 1)
shows that bequests xM are positive in BM if and only if the M.G.R. capital stock
4When f ′′(kM ) is sufficiently low, a small increase in kM induces an infinitesimal variation in the
interest factor and an increase in the market wage. So, the labor income of children increases while
saving income of parents does not vary. As a result, although more altruist, parents bequeath less.
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kM is larger than φ(kM).5 Importantly, this condition holds in a setting where agents
a` la Diamond and a` la Barro coexist and have the same life-cycle utility U(.). Indeed,
according to Nourry and Venditti (2001, Proposition 1), the condition for altruists to
leave a positive bequest does not depend on their proportion.
2.2 - Goals, intuition and graphical illustrations.
We now reinvestigate the impact of intergenerational altruism in the light of the
existence results mentioned above. Can the dynamic inefficiency arising in DM be
removed by the introduction of intergenerational altruism ?
To answer this question, we only assume that the production f(.) and life-cycle
utility U(.) functions are concave and satisfy Inada conditions. Relaxing the restrictive
assumption of Abel (1987) and Weil (1987) implies that DM may exhibit multiple
non-trivial steady states. Our objective is then to construct an example where the dy-
namics of capital in DM take the form depicted in Figure 1. Under this configuration,
DM has three non-trivial steady states. Note that if the Golden Rule capital stock
kG corresponds to kD2 , then k
D
1 and k
D
2 are dynamically efficient and k
D
3 is not Pareto
optimal. Starting from k0 > k
D
2 , DM exhibits monotone convergence towards k
D
3 . The
multiplicity of steady states in DM (see the LHS of Figure 1) is necessary to get at the
same time positive bequests in BM (see the RHS of Figure 1) and over-accumulation
of capital in DM.
According to Figure 1, we have φ(kM) < kM . Then, the M.G.R. equilibrium, kM ,
is a steady state of BM with positive bequests, xM . This equilibrium is stable if,
starting from any k0 in a neighborhood of k
M , BM converges toward kM . Indeed,
for each k0 close to k
M , there exists a unique implicit price of bequest q⋆0 such that
(k0, q
⋆
0) is on the stable manifold and the equilibrium path converges to the M.G.R.
Then, Figure 1 identifies a situation where the introduction of altruistic individu-
als prevents a society from converging to a non Pareto optimal equilibrium. Indeed,
starting from k0, a selfish economy converges to a non Pareto optimal equilibrium
kD3 , whereas an economy with intergenerational altruism converges to a Pareto opti-
mal steady state, i.e., the M.G.R. kM . The configuration depicted in Figure 1 therefore
5Obviously, when kD is unique and φ(.) is locally concave (around kD), kM > φ(kM ) if and only
if kM > kD. We recognize in this special case the condition derived by Abel (1987) and Weil (1987).
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Figure 1: The intergenerational altruism rules out the dynamic efficiency.
enlightens the positive influence of intergenerational altruism on dynamic inefficiency.
Nevertheless the following puzzle remains to be solved: is it possible to achieve this
outcome under reasonable assumptions? The next section provides the reader
with an example in this direction.
3 A parameterized example
We first define the fundamentals (production and utility functions) of the economy and
then distinguish different cases depending on whether individuals are altruistic or not.
3.1 - Fundamentals.
Consider a perfectly competitive economy which evolves over an infinite horizon.
Time is discrete; population is assumed constant (n = 0) and consists of agents who
live for two periods. Young agents born in t supply a fixed amount of labor, receive
the market wage wt, consume ct and save st. When old, they earn and consume dt+1.
Preferences are represented by the following life-cycle utility U(.) function:
U(ct, dt+1) = ln ct + ln dt+1
Firms produce a homogenous good using physical capital, Kt, and labor, Lt, accord-
ing to a constant returns to scale technology represented by the production function
F (.). Homogeneity of degree one allows us to write output per young as a function f(.)
of the capital stock per-young, i.e., f(kt) = F (kt, 1)+(1−δ)kt, where kt = Kt/Lt is the
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capital stock per-young. We let δ ∈ [0, 1] be the constant depreciation rate of capital.
Since markets are perfectly competitive, each factor is paid at its marginal product,
i.e., wt = FL(kt, 1) = f(kt)− ktf
′(kt) and Rt = FK(kt, 1)− δ = f
′(kt), where Rt is the
interest factor at time t.
Following Galor and Ryder (1989), we consider a piecewise-defined production func-
tion f , depicted in Figure 2, which satisfies standard properties (it is taken to be twice
continuously differentiable, positive, increasing and strictly concave):
f(kt) =


(2 + 3 ln 1.5 + ln 5) kt − kt ln kt + 1 if 0 < kt ≤ 4
(5 + ln 5 + 3 ln 6) kt − 4 kt ln kt − 11 if 4 < kt ≤ 5
(4 + 3 ln 6) kt − 3 kt ln kt − 6 if 5 < kt ≤ 7
(2.5 + 3 ln 6− 1.5 ln 7) kt − 1.5 kt ln kt + 4.5 if 7 < kt ≤ 10
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kt
k t
+1
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Figure 2: The production function f(.)
Using f(.), it is straightforward to show that wt is a continuous, positive, increasing
function of kt and that Rt is a continuous, positive, decreasing function of kt:
wt =


kt + 1 if 0 < kt ≤ 4
4kt − 11 if 4 < kt ≤ 5
3kt − 6 if 5 < kt ≤ 7
1.5kt + 4.5 if 7 < kt ≤ 10
Rt =


1 + 3 ln 1.5 + ln 5− ln kt if 0 < kt ≤ 4
1 + ln 5 + 3 ln 6− 4 ln kt if 4 < kt ≤ 5
1 + 3 ln 6− 3 ln kt if 5 < kt ≤ 7
1 + 3 ln 6− 1.5 ln 7− 1.5 ln kt if 7 < kt ≤ 10
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The capital stock in period t+ 1 is financed by the savings of the generation born
in t. Hence, using an intensive form representation, we get: kt+1 = st. We can now
distinguish different cases depending on whether individuals are altruistic or not.
3.2 - Diamond’s (1965) model (DM).
In this context, agents are selfish and solve:
max
ct,st,dt+1
U(ct, dt+1)
s.t. wt = ct + st and Rt+1st = dt+1.
Since U(.) = ln ct + ln dt+1, we obtain st = wt/2. Then, the dynamics of capital
stock kt+1 = st = φ(kt) of DM, which is represented Figure 3, take the following form:
kt+1 = φ(kt) =
wt
2
=


0.5 kt + 0.5 if 0 < kt ≤ 4
2 kt − 5.5 if 4 < kt ≤ 5
1.5 kt − 3 if 5 < kt ≤ 7
0.75 kt + 2.25 if 7 < kt ≤ 10
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
kt
k t
+1
kt+1=kt
kt+1=φ(kt)
Figure 3: Dynamics in the Diamond’s (1965) model.
As kG = f ′−1(1) = 6, DM possesses two steady states, kD1 = 1 and k
D
2 = 6, which
are dynamically efficient, and one, kD3 = 9, which is non Pareto optimal. Importantly,
as in Figure 1, kD2 is unstable but k
D
1 and k
D
3 are locally stable. Then:
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Result 1.
Starting from k0 > k
D
2 , DM exhibits monotone convergence towards k
D
3 , i.e.,
towards a non Pareto optimal equilibrium.
Note that, even if the stability of kD3 is local, k0 can be as low as one wants. Indeed,
our example is a generic case rather than a special case since it was obtained solving
a system of 10 equations in 12 unknowns. So, one can exhibit an infinite number of
economies satisfying the LHS of Figure 1. Then, one can always choose constant pa-
rameters of f(.) to obtain given values of kD1 , k
D
2 and k
D
3 .
3.3 - Barro’s (1974) model (BM).
We now adopt Barro’s (1974) specification of the bequest motive: parents (born at
time t) assign a positive weight to their children’s utility in their own utility function,
and possibly leave them a bequest xt+1. Importantly, bequests xt are restricted to be
non-negative at all date t. Then, an altruist solves:
Vt(xt) = max
ct,dt+1,xt+1
U(ct, dt+1) + βVt+1(xt+1)
s.t. wt + xt = ct + st, Rt+1st = dt+1 + (1 + n)xt+1 and xt+1 ≥ 0.
where Vt+1(xt+1) denotes the utility of a representative descendant who inherits xt+1
and β ∈ (0, 1] the intergenerational degree of altruism of the dynasty.
According to Section 2.2, altruists choose to leave positive bequests in the long
run if and only if φ(kM) < kM . Since β ∈ (0, 1], we have kM = f ′−1(1/β) ∈ (0, kG].
Therefore, as indicated in the LHS of Figure 1, bequests are non-negative if and only if
kM ∈ (kD1 , k
G]; the area where φ(kM) ≤ kM . Then, the M.G.R. equilibrium is a steady
state equilibrium of BM with positive bequest if and only if: β > β⋆ = 1/f ′(kD1 ) =
1/f ′(1) = 1/[1 + 3 ln 1.5 + ln 5].
Denoting by qt the implicit price of bequests xt, it is easy to obtain the following two
dimensional dynamical system which describes the equilibrium paths in a neighborhood
of the M.G.R. steady state (kM , qM):
kt+1 = f(kt)−
(1 + β)
βqt
≡ ψ(kt, qt) and qt+1 =
qt
βf ′(ψ(kt, qt))
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Figure 4: Dynamics in the Barro’s (1974) model.
Figure 4 depicts the phase diagram of this dynamical system for a given degree of
altruism (β = 0.9). For each degree of altruism β compatible with positive bequests,
our model is formally equivalent to a model with infinitely lived agents and (kM , qM)
is a regular saddle point. Thus, the form of the dynamics of the BM is equivalent to
the one described in the RHS of Figure 1 and we have:
Result 2.
For every β ∈ (β⋆, 1], there exists ε > 0 such that starting from k0 ∈ (k
M −
ε, kM + ε), BM exhibits saddle point convergence towards kM , i.e, towards a
Pareto optimal equilibrium.
Therefore, our example identifies a situation where altruistic individuals prevent a
society from converging to a non Pareto optimal equilibrium. Indeed, when the degree
of altruism is sufficiently large, local methods are sufficient to guarantee that there
exist initial values of the capital stock k0 (and of x0) for which the economy without
altruism converges to a non-Pareto-efficient steady state while the economy with al-
truism does converge to a Pareto efficient steady state from the same k0.
Result 2 guarantees that there exists a positive number ε > 0 such that starting
from k0 ∈ (0, k
M + ε), the Barro economy converges to the M.G.R. equilibrium when
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β = 1.6 Since kM = kG = kD2 , starting from k0 ∈ I1 = (k
D
2 , k
D
2 + ε) 6= ∅, the dynamic
inefficiency that occurs in the Diamond economy is removed by the introduction of
Barro’s (1974) intergenerational altruism. Regarding the robustness of the non-empty
property of I1, the local analysis is sufficient to show (by continuity) that I1 is still
non-empty for values of β different from one. To resume: when β is large enough
the dynamic inefficiency that occurs in the Diamond (1965) economy is
removed by the introduction of Barro’s (1974) intergenerational altruism.
4 The efficiency of altruism
Our parameterized example suggests that the introduction of altruistic agents can pre-
vent a society from converging to a non Pareto optimal equilibrium. However, the
example only focuses on two polar cases (agents are either life cyclers or altruists).
Considering a society in which these two types of individual coexist is a major issue, as
it provides a way to gauge the actual positive influence of intergenerational altruism.
How much altruism is necessary to rule out the dynamic inefficiency ?
In order to address this question, we consider, following Michel and Pestieau (1998)
and Nourry and Venditti (2001), an OLG model that embeds Diamond’s (1965) and
Barro’s (1974) framework. The population now consists of a proportion p > 0 of altru-
istic agents (which behaviors have been examined in Section 3.2) and of a proportion
1− p of non-altruistic agents (described in Section 3.1).
When the long run optimal bequest xM is positive, the steady state capital stock kM
satisfies the M.G.R., and does not depend on the proportion of altruists p. An arbitrar-
ily small proportion of altruistic agents, whose degree of altruism is sufficiently large,
is sufficient to obtain the results mentioned in Section 3.3 (see Michel and Pestieau,
1998 or Nourry and Venditti, 2001). The proportion p of altruists has an impact on
the amount xM of long-run bequests but neither the existence nor the stability proper-
ties of the M.G.R are affected by p. However, the dimension of the dynamical system
which describes the equilibrium paths in a neighborhood of the M.G.R. steady state
depends on whether p = 1 or p < 1. The previous section has shown that the case
6Recently Le Van and Morhaim (2006) fill the gap between growth models when the discount factor
β is close to one and when it equals one. They show that the optimal growth problem is continuous
with respect to the discount factor β under standard assumptions. Such a global turnpike result
guarantees the fact that the analysis of this section are well defined when β is equal to one.
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p = 1 induces a two-period dynamical system. If p < 1, the dimension of the corre-
sponding dynamical system which describes the equilibrium paths in a neighborhood
of the M.G.R. is three. We hence show (see Appendix A) that, when β is close to one,
the M.G.R. equilibrium kM is a regular saddle point whatever p > 0. Thus, we do not
need population to consist exclusively of altruists to rule out the dynamic inefficiency.
Result 3.
The existence of an arbitrarily low proportion of altruists can be sufficient
to prevent a society from converging to a non Pareto optimal equilibrium.
To sum up, the main contribution of this paper is to show that there exist economies
which the intertemporal equilibria converge toward a steady state characterized by an
over-accumulation of capital when there are only non-altruistic agents (p = 0), leading
thus to dynamic efficiency, but converge toward the M.G.R. as soon as a positive
proportion (p > 0) of altruistic agents is introduced. As a consequence, even if the
proportion of altruists remains close to zero, dynamic efficiency is removed. It could
be interesting to analyze how this main result can be extended to framework with
uncertain lifetimes (e.g., Fuster, 2000), political process (e.g., Boldrin and Rustichini,
2000), endogenous labor supply (e.g., Cazzavillan and Pintus, 2004) or endogenous
intergenerational altruism (e.g., Rapoport and Vidal, 2007).
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Appendix A. Stability of the Modified Golden Rule equilibrium
We study the (local) stability of the M.G.R. equilibrium in an economy where there
is a proportion 0 < p < 1 of agents a` la Barro and a proportion 1 − p of agents a` la
Diamond. Denoting by xt the level of bequests and by qt the implicit price of bequests,
it is easy to obtain the following three dimensional dynamical system:
kt+1 =
(1 + p)[f(kt)− ktf
′(kt)]
2
+ p xt −
p
qt
≡ φ(kt, qt, xt)
qt+1 =
qt
βf ′(φ(kt, qt, xt))
xt+1 = f
′(φ(kt, qt, xt))
[
f(kt)− ktf
′(kt) + xt −
2
qt
]
After some tedious computations7 we obtain the characteristic polynomial P(λ) =
7Our dynamical system corresponds to eqs. (18) to (20) of Nourry and Venditti (2001), when
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λ3 − T λ2 + J λ − D = 0 with T = 1 + 1/β − βf ′′(kM)[(1 + p)f(kM) − 2kM ]/2,
J = 1/β − f ′′(kM)(1 − p)[f(kM) − kM ]/2 and D = −(1 − p)kMf ′′(kM)/(2β). Since
we have two predetermined variables, kt, xt, and one forward variable, qt, the M.G.R.
steady state (kM , qM , xM) is said to be saddle point stable if (and only if) two eigen-
values of P(.) are inside the unit circle and one outside.
To stress the relevance and the robustness of our parameterized example, we now
establish that the M.G.R. can be a regular saddle point whatever the proportion p
of altruists, i.e., even with an arbitrarily small proportion of altruists. This result
can be established focusing on economies in which the degree of altruism β is close
enough to one. When β = 1, we have kM = 6, f(kM) = 18 and f ′′(kM) = −1/2.
Hence, the characteristic polynomial P(λ) which describes the equilibrium paths in
the neighborhood of (kM , xM , qM) becomes:
P(λ) = λ3 −
(7
2
+
9
2
p
)
λ2 +
(
4− 3p
)
λ−
3
2
+
3
2
p = 0
Then, P ′(λ) = 3λ2 −
(
7 + 9p
)
λ + 4 − 3p is positive for all negative λ. Moreover
P ′(1) = −12p is negative. Then, the characteristic polynomial P(λ) varies as follows:
λ −∞ 0 λ′ 1 λ′′ +∞
P ′(λ) 0 — 0 +
P(λ) −∞ 
1
XXXXXq "
">
+∞
Let κ = 3(1 − p)/2 the product of the roots of P(.). Since P(0) = 3(p − 1)/2,
P(1) = −6p and P(κ) = −27p(1 − p)2/2 are negative for all positive p, P(λ) has a
real root λ˜1 outside the unit circle (λ˜1 > max{κ, 1}). The other two roots λ˜2 and λ˜3
are either both complex and conjugate (i.e, |λ˜2| = |λ˜3| = m) or both positive, real and
lower than one (i.e., 0 < λ˜2 < λ˜3 < 1). Assume that λ˜2 and λ˜3 are complex roots
(of modulus m) of P(.). Since the product of the roots of P(.) is equal to κ, we have
m2λ˜1 = κ. Since λ˜1 > κ we have necessarily m < 1. Consequently, whatever p > 0, we
have (at most) two cases. Either P(.) experiences two complex roots λ˜2, λ˜3 inside the
unit circle and one positive real root λ˜1 outside the unit circle. Either P(.) experiences
three real positive roots such that: 0 < λ˜2 < λ˜3 < 1 < λ˜1. Hence, as two eigenvalues of
P(.) are inside the unit circle and one outside, the M.G.R. steady state (kM , qM , xM )
is saddle point stable whatever p > 0. 
Ua(.) = Ue(.) = ln ct + ln dt+1.
